Analysis of Duplicate Records in Wisconsin Voter Registration Database

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Overview of Findings

Analysis of a subset of 61,580 Milwaukee County voter registration records reveals a significant pattern of duplicate records identified through matching CodedID values. From this subset, 4,387 records with duplicate CodedIDs were identified, confirming that 100% of these records have different VoterRegNumbers despite representing the same individuals. This pattern suggests potential structural vulnerabilities in the voter registration system that could enable multiple registrations for the same person.

1	Coded ID	COD 1	COD 2	COD 3	COD 4	COD 5	COD 6	COD 7	COD 8	COD 9	COD 10	Voter Reg Number
61543	zzJVfxBsq7	z	z	J	V	f	x	B	s	q	7	7,295,080
61544	zzk9YO8yrB	z	z	k	9	Y	O	8	y	r	B	46,633,617
61545	zzkDUNJi03	z	z	k	D	U	N	J	i	0	3	14,169,775
61546	zZklw3jGD/	z	Z	k	l	w	3	j	G	D	/	706,685,170
61547	zZkXRkdiEt	z	Z	k	X	R	k	d	i	E	t	9,434,261
61548	zZkXRkdiEt	z	Z	k	X	R	k	d	i	E	t	700,957,058
61549	ZZLTxnxtsZ	Z	Z	L	T	x	n	x	t	s	Z	46,703,642
61550	ZZmqvaObfC	Z	Z	m	q	v	a	O	b	f	C	701,061,755
61551	zznn27kKl6	z	z	n	n	2	7	k	K	l	6	46,612,648
61552	zzoPdLv+SY	z	z	o	P	d	L	v	+	S	Y	7,262,198
61553	ZzOtKk5Otg	Z	z	O	t	K	k	5	O	t	g	46,550,547
61554	zZPCBCF5rr	z	Z	P	C	B	C	F	5	r	r	46,613,686
61555	ZZpcRdjHvw	Z	Z	p	c	R	d	j	H	v	w	51,059,014
61556	zzPluKsNm7	z	z	P	l	u	K	s	N	m	7	7,266,458
61557	ZZpZP0w0Ng	Z	Z	p	Z	P	0	w	0	N	g	7,259,505
61558	zZqL6L7PX3	z	Z	q	L	6	L	7	P	X	3	700,452,600
61559	zZqL6L7PX3	z	Z	q	L	6	L	7	P	X	3	700,562,917

Figure 1 Duplicate coded ID numbers highlighted in pink. Note that Voter registration ID numbers do not match.

Quantitative Evidence

The distribution of duplicate CodedIDs shows that 91.2% (4,000 records) appear in pairs, 8.0% (351 records) in triplets, 0.5% (20 records) in sets of four, 0.1% (6 records) in sets of six, and 0.2% (10 records) in sets of ten. This clearly demonstrates the systematic nature of these duplications rather than isolated incidents.

CodedID_Count

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2	4000	91.2	91.2	91.2
	3	351	8.0	8.0	99.2
	4	20	.5	.5	99.6
	6	6	.1	.1	99.8
	10	10	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	4387	100.0	100.0	

Address analysis reveals that 86.8% (1,843) of unique CodedIDs have all associated records sharing the exact same Address1 value (street address). Even more significantly, 97.7% (2,075) of unique CodedIDs have exactly the same Address2 value (city, state, ZIP code) across all their duplicate records. Only 2.3% (49) of CodedID groups have any Address2 variation, and none have more than two different Address2 values. This definitively eliminates the explanation that these duplicates were created due to voters moving between jurisdictions.

When strictly examining personally identifiable information across records with matching CodedIDs, 91.2% (2,063 records) have matching names and 87.1% (1,972 records) have matching addresses. A substantial 79.1% (1,791 records) of duplicate CodedID records are confirmed to represent the same person based on matching both name and address. A fuzzy match method, where a first or middle initial is substituted for the full name, or other similar small changes, finds that 100% of records with the same CodedID represent the same individual.

Notable Patterns

The database contains striking examples of multiple registrations, including one individual (Stephanie Emma Kostowicz) with 10 separate voter registration records sharing the same CodedID, address, and registration date, but having consecutive odd numbered VoterRegNumbers (701,051,527 through 701,051,571). Such patterns indicate these duplications were not random errors but rather systematic occurrences.

Many duplicate records show registration numbers that are consecutive or in close numeric proximity, suggesting batch processing or related temporal creation. The data reveals that duplicate records typically have one "Active" status while others are marked as "Inactive" or "Merged," indicating the system maintains one primary record while retaining duplicates.

This analysis affirms findings from previous research across multiple states identifying similar non-standard database implementations. The presence of duplicate registration records with unique ID numbers may potentially violate HAVA Section 303(a)(1)(A) requirements, as they

could technically enable multiple ballots per voter, regardless of whether such vulnerability has been exploited.

ApplicationSource	CodedID	VoterRegNumber	RegistrationDate	FirstName	MiddleNam	LastName	ouseNumb	Address1	Address2	VoterStatus
	0/R4URDT+7	46,637,569	01/01/2000	Gerald	H	Weiler	1119	1119 W TIFFANY LN	OAK CREEK WI 53154	Inactive
	0/R4URDT+7	46,637,570	01/01/2000	Gerald	S	Weiler	1119	1119 W TIFFANY LN	OAK CREEK WI 53154	Active
Online Registration	03ISFTbNZx	701,151,663	08/19/2020	Hannah	Michele	Brown	7782	7782 S DREXEL RIDGE WAY APT 104	OAK CREEK WI 53154	Active
Online Registration	03ISFTbNZx	701,151,664	08/19/2020	Hannah	Michele	Brown	7782	7782 S DREXEL RIDGE WAY APT 104	OAK CREEK WI 53154	Inactive
Clerks Office	0eSXv1AgGv	701,412,036	10/06/2020	Qun	Miao	Yang	7045	7045 S Riverwood Blvd UNIT 209	Franklin WI 53132	Active
Clerks Office	0eSXv1AgGv	701,412,303	10/06/2020	Qun	MIAO	Yang	7045	7045 S Riverwood Blvd UNIT 209	Franklin WI 53132	Inactive
Online Registration	0kBL2aFcUq	700,886,439	12/19/2019	Marguerit	Ann	Roberts	2175	2175 N 64TH ST	WAUWATOSA WI 53213	Active
	0kBL2aFcUq	46,688,509	01/01/1918	Marguerit	A.	Roberts	2175	2175 N 64TH ST	WAUWATOSA WI 53213	Inactive
Online Registration	0KF0qwkRvc	701,141,979	08/17/2020	Katryn	Irene	Seeburger	4174	4174 N BARTLETT AVE	SHOREWOOD WI 53211	Active
Online Registration	0KF0qwkRvc	701,141,980	08/17/2020	Katryn	Irene	Seeburger	4174	4174 N BARTLETT AVE	SHOREWOOD WI 53211	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,527	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,529	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Active
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,531	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,533	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,535	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,537	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,539	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,541	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,569	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Polling Place	16udjS6A+g	701,051,571	04/07/2020	Stephanie	Emma	Kostowicz	2903	2903 W FRANKLIN TER	FRANKLIN WI 53132	Inactive
Clerks Office	179aOw8R9M	700,277,506	11/04/2016	AMAL	A	HAMMAD	4126	4126 W COLLEGE AVE	GREENFIELD WI 53221	Active
Clerks Office	179aOw8R9M	700,277,676	11/04/2016	AMAL	A	HAMMAD	4126	4126 W COLLEGE AVE	GREENFIELD WI 53221	Inactive
	1cZI5Cx6rU	7,439,650	10/20/2003	Wendy	A	Schmidt	1834	1834 E SAINT FRANCIS AVE	SAINT FRANCIS WI 53235	Inactive
	1cZI5Cx6rU	7,439,651	02/11/2004	Wendy	A	Schmidt	1834	1834 E SAINT FRANCIS AVE	SAINT FRANCIS WI 53235	Inactive

Responses to hypothetical explanations:

"These were merged, only one record is active, so there is no problem."

This explanation fails to address several critical issues revealed by the data analysis:

First, while it's true that many duplicate records show "Inactive" or "Merged" status, the fundamental problem remains that multiple registration records exist for the same individuals with different VoterRegNumbers. This database structure could potentially enable reactivation of inactive records through various administrative pathways.

Second, the data shows numerous instances of consecutive registration numbers created on the same date (like the Kostowicz example with 10 records), which cannot be explained as normal "merging" of discovered duplicates. These appear to be created simultaneously rather than detected and merged later.

Third, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) specifically requires states to implement "a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list" where "each legally registered voter appears in the list only once." The current implementation with multiple VoterRegNumbers for the same individual appears inconsistent with this requirement.

"The coded ID proves we know they are illegal duplicates, but it is our way of tracking them."

This explanation is problematic for several reasons:

First, if CodedIDs were intended as duplicate tracking mechanisms, we would expect official documentation and consistent implementation. However, similar patterns appear across multiple

states without such documentation, suggesting it's an undisclosed feature of the database implementation.

Second, a proper tracking system would maintain a single registration record with a history log, not create multiple separate records with unique VoterRegNumbers that could potentially be activated separately.

Third, if officials acknowledge these are "illegal duplicates," then maintaining them in the active database rather than archiving them after merging creates unnecessary structural vulnerability in the system, regardless of intent.

In conclusion, both explanations fail to address the fundamental issue: the database maintains multiple registration pathways for the same individual, creating potential vulnerability in the electoral system that goes beyond mere record-keeping practices.